The complexity of the merchant-fisher relationship : revising the merchant domination thesis by Adams, Gordon




The Comp~li~"of tbe Mnc:ballt-Filibn Relarionship:
Re,"ising the Merc:haal Do.iaatioll nais
by
Gordo. Adams
A major report submitted to
the School ofGnlduate Studin
in partial fulfillmeat of the
requirements for the degree of
Mastn of MariDe Studies
Fisheries Rrsouf'Ct MlltI"gelMtI'
Fisheries and Mari.e Institult of
Memorial Uni'"trsit)" of N~fondlaDd
St. JohD's Nrwfoundlaad
Abstract
1bc xademic peteq)lion orme historical rok or mtTChants and the system orcn=dit that
they employed in Ihc' Nev.foWKIland statt has been changing in recent ~"ears. panicularly among
scholars i'Iere in Nt~foundland. In the past. merchants ha\·t bomt much of lhc blame fot both
the social and economic problems that were prevalent in this region prior to 1950. Poverty. the
absence of significafll CQmmuni~" dt\"elopmenL the cleavage of social ties \\ithin communities.
and e\"en the collapse of the Ne~fou:ldland stalt in the 19305 havt been attributed largely to the
self-interested economic activities or tile merchant class. Gerald Sider's work has been cited as a
good example ofmis perspective. Some scholars have now begun to consider othtr conuibuting
factors to these problems. howe'"er. such as tht role oflechnologicaJ change. the inherem
complexi~"oflhe credit or ·truck' system. and tht ntt::tsSit~"orcredil to the propter fWlCtioning of
tht infonnal economy. An imponant asptct of this recent work is that it has btgun to suggest
that merchants wtre also operaling undC'r constraint. Constquently, Ihtir abili~' 10 re-in\'tsl in
communitits or alter their modt ofbusintsS to remedy Ne~foundland's social and economic ills
may ha\"t been quite limited,
AtKtract_.
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I might never ha\'e rC3d Gerald Sider's Cuitwe and OQSs in Anthropology alld
History: A Nt'I\foundland IIIwtration l if it were not for the prodding. of Rex Clarl:. an
instnJctor in my program 3tld the head of Memorial's Anthropology depanment. He
suggested 10 me thai this work aOers some imeresting insight into the history ofsocial
relations. particularly regarding the structure ofclass. in Newfoundland outports. My
reading ofSider's hook. at thai time. left: me with some relatively minor misgivings
(viewed in tcnns of what I have learned since) regarding the accuracy of some ofSider"s
interpretations. and the manner in which he seems to generalize his findings. I took
exception to the assumption. \"cry much implicit in Sider's book. that all Newfoundland
outports were the same. bolh across space and over time. and il was on thai poin! lhat my
tenn paper turned. Dr. Clark shared some of these concerns. but was quick to point out
thaL despite its problems. the work is nm'd and insightful in its approach to
Nc:wfoundland hist~· and has much to contribute to our knowledge of how social
relations under the system oftroc,," were structured and understood by the people
in\"Oln:d. I agreed then. and still agree now. wilh this analysis. although in some rcspe1:lS
my concerns have become compounded. So. this work began. initially. as a lenn paper
for Rcx's class. and it was only when I began my research that I discovered that Sider has
l'l:cdn:d some considerable criticism from historians and other academics at Memorial
-,-
regarding cemin aspects of his work.
For Sider. the mechanism of merchant capital. and to a lesser extent government
inaction. were the pri~._ if not sole. causes for the economic problems endemic in the
outports during what he calls the "family fishery:' Merchants were directly responsible
for preventing capital accumulation and social differentiation in rural communities
because they were interested in preserving their conlfOl of the options available to OUlport
residents. They did this primarily through the utilization ofcredit in the outparts and the
implication is that this was a wilful and premeditated control tactic_ In other words. they
could have done otherwise if they had only been more agreeable_ Sider's goal is 10 show
how relations belween the merchant class and -fisherfolk- were struCiured under truck.
and how this structural configuration was maintained and perpetuated through the use of
this mechanism-in other words. he is explaining why change did not and could not take
place_ Sider's assessment of the role of merchants in Newfoundland history is markedly
different howeHr. from some of me other perspectives that "-ill be p~nted in this
paper. The question that this work addresses is: to what C:\1enl did merchants control
economic circumstances in the outpons? If Sider-s analysis is correct then merchants
were very much in control but as we shall see. there were other factors. such as changing
technologies and the complexity of credit strategies. which may have had an equally
important role to play in shaping the social and economic history of me outports.
The amount of historical work that has been conducted to clarify the role of
.:!-
merchants in the Newfoundland state is quite limited. Much of me criticism ofSider·s
work tends to focus. therefore. 00 blunders that he makes in his historical -illustration" of
his thesis. Jim Hiller. for example. disagrees with. amoog other things. Sider·s
contention that an emerging middle class was quashed by merchants early in the 19'"
centu~' and says that this interpretation stems from the use of limited ethnographic
evidence from smaller and more recently settled communities.: Hiller goes further and
says that Sider·s use ofc\'idence is in fact sclectivc···thal he ··set out 10 find wh3t he
wanted to lind. ignoring or discounting such t\'idence as did not fit.-j And Hiller is not
alone in making this point: man~' critics ha\'e pointed to Sider·s use ofcvidence. or lack
lhcreof. as a critical weakness in his book.J Interestingly. howcver. a more recent and
growing body of work has begun to challenge Sider·s interpretation of Newfoundland
hislol')" in a different way. by attacking the fundamental historiographical foundations on
which it is predicated: Ihe notion thaI merchants. in the pursuit of their OW11 interests.
were at the root of the problems in rural Newfoundland. Bob Hong has pointed out that
lhis thesis. which has been around for some time (for example. in the wori;. of David
AlexanderSl has resulted from a -gap in the hisloriography- for the period between 1870
and 1920. Consequently. he says thaI thcre has been a misunderstanding of the role that
merchants played in the Newfoundland economy.&
Although Sider·s approach is novel. its utility and. more often. the manner in
which its components have been illustrated. have been assessed less favorably. Much like
any work thai breaks with convenlion. Sider's analysis is not without its problems. and
this. I think. is particularly true of his micrcranalysis ofspccilic forms ofcustom and
language. It is wonhwhile (0 note. however. that this work was not intended as a
·hist0r)'.· in the suiclcst sense. at all. Sider clearly states this point himself. with
particular reference to the discussion ofpolilics in part three. and I think that this is no
less true of the entire wor\;.' The point is that Newfoundland is here used as an
illllSlratioll. as an introduction to a conceptual model for the integration ofculture into
our notion ofchange and how it takes place. Therefore. objections to particular historical
rcferences or interpretations. in this case. while they may be valid. do not detract directly
from the model. Rather. they detract from its support. It would be a different case if the
criticism were that the model connot be illustrated. but I have not come across this
argument in the reviews thai I have studied! Indeed. it may well be possible to
successfully illustrate the son of role lor culture lhat Sider ad\'ocates in the processes
driving change using a diffcrent historical contextlhan the one he has chosen. In an)'
case. Sider has shoun us. and I doubt that many would disagree. that merchant capital
had its problems. but. if we look at some of the other relevant factors. it can be shown that
merchant capital was confined within a larger set of negative circumstances that created
problems tor merchants as well as Iishermen. More on this later.
Sider"s dcvelopment of the conjunction ofculture and class is. however. in my
view. brilliant. and I suspect that a closer look at a more represenlative sample ofOUlport
communities would serve to bear it OUl although some further definition might be
required for the more prosperous towns. My first task will be to de,'elop a vC!')· rough
sketch of the major historical periods delineated by Sider for use in developing his
theoretical framework. I will then explore some of the key points that he develops within
this conlext in formulating an illustration ofho\\" culture is an integral pan of the
processes driving change in class-based societies and. in particular. how il functions as
both a product and a shaping force in social relations.
This work is intended as a comparative presentation and analysis ofGerald Sider's
merchant domination thesis with se,·cral historical works that. taken together. provide an
historiographical perspective that places more social and economic conlrol in the hands of
the people. I will present a summ~' ofSider·s main ideas first and this will then be
lollowed by material thai directly contndicts his characterization of Newfoundland
history.
It has been suggcsled to me that my use of sources is selective. This was
necessar:y. first of aiL 10 prevent this paper from beeoming unmanageable in tcons of
length. but also because what is ofpanicular interest for me is the comp1exio· of the
economic and social situation that merchams and fishermen were: faced with. In my view.
a large part of the reason that merehants have recei,"ed much of the blame for
Newfoundland· s ills is thai they ha'"e been taken more or less in isolation from other
complicating historical factors that have hitherto been unkno\\n. poorly understood. or
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have gone unaddressed. This paper will explore some of the recent contributions to our
unde~tandin!!ofmerchant4 lisher relations in the outports. particularly those dealing with
the role of technological change in Newfoundland·s fishery. thc role of the -infonnal
economy.- and what can be said about the e:o.:tent to which individuals Wett bound to
particular merchants. It would be impossible. hett. to deal with any of these areas
exhaustively so I ha\'c chosen source materials that have. in my opinion. contributed
greatly (0 our understanding of the problems and issues in each case. Robert Hong is
responsible for a wonderful M.A. thesis on the role of the cod trap which I think is very
imponant. On the complexity ofcredit I have taken Roben Sweeny as the authority
because of his work on Bona\'ista merchant legers. And. on the infonnal economy. I ha\'e
looked to Rosemary Gmmer whose work in this area is vcry well known and respected.
Sean Cadigan also dc:serns mention. although I ha\'e not included as much of his work in
this as I would ha\'e liked.· The article of his that I have cited. however. does pro\'ide a
powerful counter to Sider's argument and. for anyone that is interested. it is essential
re3ding. I will also be discussing the implications that th~ worl.:s hold for Sider·s
thesis. for I think that with somc qualification. much ofwhat he has 10 say about thc
social experience of his subjects has meriL although the reasons for their plight may have
b~'en decidedly more complex than simple "domination" by the merchant class. My
purpose here is to show that lishennen and their families possessed a considerable share
ofcontrol over the ~onomic and social circumstances in which they were involved.
They did not always go where: they were pushed. A closer examination of Sider's thesis
is necessary firsl ofall, howe\·er. in order 10 gel a ~ner handle on what is being critiqued.
Ntwfoandland's His.on' pi,'idtd
Sider divides Newfoundland's history into three main part.e;: the migratory Iishel')'
(until about 18401. the family based fishery (from about 1840-19501 and the dragger
fishel')'-beginning after World War II. Sider calls the period between 1800 and 1840 a
"double transitional period" because he believes that both the mode ofpayment and the
social organization of the fishel')' changed at this lime: payment changed from cash to
'1nJck- and migratory servants were replaced by residenl families with production
centered around kin networks. III This mode of production lasted for over one hundred
years until it was superttded by trawlers, These were characterized by new technology
including. freezing capability and a reorganization of the labor process. In the context of
the migratol')· fIShery. settlement was. in Sider's view, opposed by meTChants and
government alike. mainly through the denial ofproperty rights. for a couple of important
reasons: First. settlers would be in competition with the migralory fleet for the best
landing sites and lor lumber. Equally imponant was the fact that the desertion ofsailors
brought o\"cr from Europe would represent a loss of potential recruits to the naval fleet
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The result of this opposition was lension between ship's caplains and planters (a term that
had broad application from the poorest of fishennen to those that o\\ned their own
enlerpri~and hired set"\-ants). and because oflhis the swlers were: alternately anacked.
burned ouL or tolerated as a source of bait and supplemental labor.
The conflici was one reason for Ihe demise of the SCt"Vant fishery. The other. 3nd
perhaps more imponant. reason was the impossibility ofmainlaining discipline in the
labor force. Merchants could no! be sure whether poor calch represented scarcity offish
or lack ofeffort by servants. Because of the variation in return. merchants became
increasingly Jess willing to sign contracts guaranleeing wages. and their reluctance was
aided by legal rulings and governor's decrees. toward the end of the servant fishery.
which held that no wages at all need be paid to "disobedient" servants. II [,"en wo~. by
the 18..1Os. the courts were refusing to uphold the servanfs lien on fish. and this
effectively meant that servants had no way afensuring that they were paid far their
wark.1= The splil betWttll interests coupled with a growing population-which in an
imponant way made change possiblc-signaled the end of the servant fisheT)'.
This change occurred in a conlext where population had been rapidly increasing
relative to the early eighteenth century" Towards the end of the century (179051. the
inshore fishery came to be prosecuted almost entirely by Newfoundland residents and the
migratol')" tishc,!" retre.ltcd to the banks" I: was with the end oflhc migratory fishery thai
the double transitional period began" First. the organization arthe tishery changed from
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servants to famil~' based units. and second. the fann of payment changed from cash wage
totnlck. '3
Two atlempts at the formation ofan outporl middle class occurTed during the
nineteemh cemury. one at the beginning. and again around mid-centul)'. and each failed
to get beyond its infancy for ditlerent reasons. The establishment ora group of
prosperous planlers al the outset was quashed when !he large English and Jersey Isle
merchanl firms began to deal with local families. This put the migratory ships. which
supplied the planlers with servants and supplies. out ofbusiness. Around mid-cemury.
there began an acceleration and diversification in economic acti\·it)· centered mainly
around a locally established and owned schooner fishery on the nonheast coast and a
bank Iishe~' on the soulh coast. These went into decline with the ad·.ent of steam ships
which took o\'cr these economic pursuits and shifted the economic base 10 St. John·s.
This was only a part ofthc cause. however. The price oflish and Newfoundland's market
share also declined due to the building of railroads in Europe which made for case in
u'ansponing Norwegian codfish 10 Naples. This caused many of the smaller locally
owned enlerprises in Newfoundland to go under.l~ During the same period. the large
merchant firms based in Europe collapsed and their place was taken by locally based
merchams who were much more interested in and capable ofexercising greater control
()\"C'r community alTairs. This greater control facilitated an even greater transfer ofcapital
to 51. John·s. As a fl.'SUIt. community development was extremely stunted. and Ihis was
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made wo~ by lhe increasing reluctance of merchanlS to exlend WiRier credil: mey had
been pushing. since me establishmern of responsible government in the I830s. to gel the
slate 10 lake on this responsibililY. If
Within the context of the family based fishe~'. merchanlS exercised sufficient
control within the communily and within government to keep inlernal dilTerentialion in
me outports to a minimum. The result of the narrow economic base was an un·laxable
populace which made government vcry unstable and torced a heavy reliance upon dUlies
placed on imported supplies for gon'mment revenue. The onset of the depression. the
depressed price of fish_ the decre3SCd consumplion of imported supplies. the necessil)' of
pro\'iding winler supply. the responsibility of maintaining modem services_ and
expenditures on diversificalion schemes exceeded the capacity ofgovernment to cope and
responsible government cnded in 1933.1~ The above discussion is taken moslly Irom
chapler two. although I have injected some delailthal Sider introduces elsewhere.
Sider lislS the following causes for the demise of the family based fishery around
Ihe middle of the twenlieth cenlU~':
1M colbpw or m3r1.:ets and price;; in thf GrnI OqJrnsion; the ;..-ail&bil~·Of"~f I3bor &1 thf brxf~
conscruC1ionproj«uduring\l,·orld\l,';uII;theOJl<'fllllgofamart.:.~rorrroZCllfM:I!lf~fOfd«p­
>0:;1 tra.. lets. from a Ilwnbo:r ofcOWltrin., that "'C1'C' so dfoci(nl the}' afTt(1N the inshon fl5hillg ilOCb: 11K
commiunc:nl ofthc NfWfoundlMld pro~ind&1 and Canadian fedtral gO'o'munents 10 -fOfCed gJOII,'th-irl the
indaslrial SC'C10l':tl'l.J Ih~ abandonmenl of§lTlall-scaJf ~okl-fas/lionf(f" enterprise; and Ih~ ~mergcnc~of
oppoRullilie$to nlTl a more dec:cnlli,·ing. oppot'lunilics forthl.' mOSI part more a~tlhall reaL-"
When Newfoundlanders \-oted to confederatc with Canada in 1949. Sider says they were
nOljust "abandoning" a counlry thai had Ireated them poorl)"' thcy were also \'oling for
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the benefits that had been promised by Joey Smallwood. Unlil the 19705. the transfer
payments !Tom the Canadian federal go\'ernment approximately equaled the amounts
earned from lishing. IJ This subslalltial1y impro\'ed the quality of life for those invoh'ed
in the fishery. but the go\'emmeOl was not interested in maintaining this way oflife. This
can be seen in the fact thal in 195.... a ''Centralization Program- was begun to move
people 10 the larger centers. The purpose of this-though concealed !Tom the public-was
10 diminate the small and expcnsi\'e·to-maintain communities. and to creale a factory
labor force. I" Sider says that the constraints imposed by merchant capital produced a
situation where fishers produced for a subsistence retum. but where this return was also
mediated by the merchant and the stale. As a result. the well·bcing of the people was not
dim::tly tied to their own eITorts. This laci comributed to a posilive and hopeful attitude
towards industrialization and factory labor in the outportS as a way of placing people's
circumstances in their own hands.:'; This was part of what made rcsenlement possible.
although there were more direct and ruthless incemivcs such as the cash payments that
rosler~d community and family division.
The abow summary ofSider's den=lopmentofthe historical periods in
Newfoundland's outpons is not intended to be complete-I may in fact have left some
important points out. The idea here was just to provide a context in which 10 base a more
directed discussion ofSider"s theoretical ITamework-the modification and conjoining of
·11·
mc Marxisl conception ofclass with a dynamic model of culture. This is imponant
because the focus ofSider's book is on Ihe family·bascd fishery'. both on me social
framework Ihat made c:\.1reme exploitation possible and upon the aspects ofculture and
class that pennined the perpetuation ofmis situation fol'" a full centur:'.
Cullure and Class
For Sider. class is the Cart concept of social history and culture is me core concept
of anthropology. When anthropologists seek to explore change mey 1001.; 10 histor:' for a
sequence ofevents. sening culture aside. Culture is often discussed only in the sense of
differences across space. The problem is that the anthropological concept ofculture is
"ahistorical. non-processural and totalizing" as a result.: 1 Because ofmis it appears as a
product ofother social forces. such as politics or economics. II becomes just a set of
phenomena that can be described with no relation 10. or rolc in. change. There is a
marxist concept ofclass. howe,"cr that is relational and processural and which centers on
the aspect of society that produces change. Sider's pl£l'POSC' is to break from the static.
deri'-ath'e notion ofculture pre,·alent in anthropology. and 'root- a revised concept of it
in the dynamics ofsocial relations.::
Sider challenges the notion thai societies have one social structure and one culture
which he says is common in anlhropological studies.:J But apan from this. the customs
·t:!-
and forms. generall~· speaking.. that we see in the culture of fishing families are
hislorically relevant in thallhey arc the context and the social expression ofa collective
awareness ofcircumstance and a re·incorpolOllion ofexperience into this social awareness
in ways that alter social relations and shape intention. Another way of putting this i<: thai
social relations within a class occur in a cullural context and this context shapes the
torms that the social relations can lake. Th~ culturally-infiuenced social structure that
emerges within the class delermines how that class will relate with other classes. Culture
is therefore the dynamic force in shaping: relations both within and between classes-··it is
where class tk.-comes dynamic:·:~
In Sider's \·iew. significant change did not take place in rural communities
between approximately 18~O and 1950. orthe time frame oflhe ··family based fishery:'
because of the forms that social relations between the merchant and fishing classes took.
Merchants are here seen as hegemonic. taking their power and control from the lies that
bound them 10 their respecli\·e clients. Because people had few oplions. there was change
from within. but only. for the most part. in cultural forms and in verbal expression.
Merchants stripped communities ofcapilal by utilizing crediL and. in response. fishennen
and their families internalized their knowledge of their siluation. as well as their anger
and indignation. and expressed it in terms of idiomatic language and (for lack of a better
word) symbolic cultural practices. A short discussion 01'3 couple ofthes~ will serve to
further my point.
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To illustrate how culture is autonomous-bom a creation ofand a shaping force in
social relationships-Sider discusses eXiensively the fonTIS that OUlport culture has laken
in both custom and language. Custom is generally inteTpf"eted as having a role to play in
the fonnation and reproduCiion ofrdationships both "imin and between families and
individuals. Specific fonns ofexpression in language are interpreted as evidence of the
collecti\·e internalization and rc:-expression ofa social awareness ofcircumstance.
Mumming and scoffing. for example. are at the center of forms of-·alliance within
and between families.··:5 Each cuslOm relates the "community of place and spacc" and
the -'community ofaccount:':' Sider identifies two forms ofscoffing: me "dinner scofT·
and the "party scoff:- The first fonn is cntirely benign and consists oflhe sort ofcooked
dinncr that many ofus here in Newfoundland recognize as 'jigs dinner-- or "Sunday
dinner:' The --party scoff' on the other hand-where food is stolen from a member aflhe
community with equal social standing for a party-is a clear correlation of tal qual:7 and
truck. and may mistakenly suggestio panicipanlS that they create their own social
anlagonisms when in fact they do not. Thai is the arena afthe merchant. Mumming is
said 10 prm'idc a contC:\.1 in which to create or renew social ties in a conle:\.1 that is less
uncomfortable for those inVOlved.=- Not eve~'onc is convinced of this however. Phillip
McCann has said that "to argue lhat mumming was a method used by fishermen 10 re·
structure the labour force strains belief to the breaking poim:',:<j I must conless that I
share his scepticism on this point. Sider repeatedly makes the point that. while outport
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culture is notable for an imimacy in personal relationships. there are distances that spring
up between people because or the constraints of producing for merchant capital. Here. I
think he is sugg~ting thai Mumming was one way of bridging that distance. Mumming
and scoffing arc' expressions of social StnlctUtt. but because they also make up part of the
cullural definition and claims of the people. they both contribute 10 the creation ofa
collective intentionality. and they represent the -self-crtation" ofa distinct peopleXl.
A cuffeI' is an untrue sto~' that is both intimate and antagonistic and it is 'lold at
the bounda~· between the known and the forgotten."J' Cuffers serve to inlroduce history
into current lifc by creating a tension between what was and what is. They teach the
lesson that there are two histories-onc real and onc= perceived. By reintroducing histor)"
into the present. cufTcrs. as a cultural fonn or custom. p!ay an important role in modeling
peoples perceptions of their circumstances and their own roles in shaping these. This sort
of acti\'ity therefore has a \'~' real impact upon how people. both within and between
classes. interact. Sider says that the pany scotT and the cutTer are related in that both
express intimacy and antagonism. but while culTers help to create a collective knowledge.
scotTs deny histo~·. J: Sid~r does not explain how they do this.
The collective knowledge and the fonnation orintemion that are continually re-
invented through the cultural practices noted above are to be seen in the language thai
p~ople use in daily lire. Sidcr discusses various tenns and idioms with a view. I think, to
showing how these arc indicati,·c ora collecti,·c awareness of circumstance and the
internalization of this in language. He has misrepresented some ofthc:se however:
··Times ..•- a time. in the fesli'·e sense. is interpreted as meaning not only a good time or a
safety \'al\'e for stresses. bul also literally as a segment of time-a proper part ofsocial life.
Sider says thaI Mumming and Scoffing are times in the Newfoundland sense of the term
(p.80). ··After .._- the peculiar grammatical use of this term in Newfoundland is
interpreted as referring toflllllre encounters with the powerful as in ·-rm after going to
see the merchant"· (meaning I wanl or am going to) or 10 situations where powerlessness
is felt (p.74-75). There are other examples of this son ofmisinterpretation. and while it
may seem trifling to identify them. (h·erton points out that"to a great extenL (Sider's]
argument is carried by just such dccontextualized and poorly interpreted anecdotes and
snippets ofinformation:·JJ
Although the interpretation of··after·· is wrong for mosL or all. areas of
Newfoundland. some of these terms may ha\'e been interpreted correctly in their
particular conte:\1S. The inteTpretation of-after- is particularly troubling. however. since
it is more e:\1.ensh·e1y used to illustrate the notion thaI social awareness is internalized and
becomes pan ofsocial expression. This point is made clearer when we considCT" thai the
imerpretation of ··after"· as future oriented is accounted for through a discussion of what
the term relers to: namely. the relationship between classes. But when we consider
'·after·· as it is actually used-as a reference to past and complete action-the "wan(' or
··helplesslcss· in this verbal expression of outport people is absent. Sider seems to be
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su,ggcsting that the cullUre ofoutport people influenced thdr social relationships with
merchants. and with each 0Iher. in such as way as to render effective resistance to
merchant dominance impossible. If the evidence for this is to be found in an analysis of
social customs and linguistic larms. however. the case has not been proven, Hiller says
that thc portrayal of lishermcn as helpless is exaggerated and points to the fact that the
Fishermen's Protective Union CFPU) was able to demonstrate that resistance was indeed
possible. He says. also. that Sider's failure to provide a thorough analysis of this
organization is "indicati"e or(hisl approach:"j.l
The Possibility or Rnislance
The characterization oflishermen and their families as hdpkss is vel)' important
lor Sider because the reasons lor that helplessness arc also the reasons for the lack of
change that he portrays. The culture of the outpam dictated how social and economic
problems would be dealt with ::md.. through culture. problems were dealt with in ways that
frnctured community ties and made resistance vel'}' diOicul1. Ultimately" therefore.
change for Sider does not take place in the outpam because people dealt with their
problems without confronting merchants" hegemonic assenions directly. Instead. they
stole from each other and told stories that were untrue. In so doing. people deflected their
lrustration and antagonisms lrom the merchant onto one another.
·17·
Scan Cadigan's studyofBaule Harbour in the 19305, however. p~ts an enlirely
different perspecti\"e on how fishermen dealt with mttthants and each oth(T.J~ This
article. entitled "Baule Harbour in Transition: Merchants. Fishermen and the State in the
Struggle for relief in a Labrador Community during the 19305:' seems to have been
wrinen as a direct challenge 10 Sider's contention that Newfoundlanders were
'handicapped' by culture. The work is set in a time and place where tensions between
merchants and tishers had reached the boiling point over the problem of winter suppl~".
By the 1930s, markets for Newfoundland's product had become increasingly unstable and
prices were poor and unpredictable. Accordingly, the major mttthant house of the area.
Baine. Johnston & Co. ofSt. John's had introduced a more restrictive credit policy that
excluded those whom the linn felt would be unlikely to pay their debts. Since
competition with other firms was ver}" much a factor for this lirm in maintaining its
supply of tish. relationships with more prosperous gear-owning fishermen (social
differentiation was n:r}" much in evidence here) were cultivated and protected. In this
case, fishermen who \\ere ad\"ClYly affected by the new policy reacted with threats of
violence and the assenion that if winter supplies were not forthcoming they would be
taken by lorce. Baine. Johnston & Co. responded by appealing to government for relief
and Ihe effort was successful. even if only because government lacked the resources to
properly police the area and protection could not be bought within the community due to
loyalties between families.';"
Cadigan's point is th:u fishermen could. and did. challenge merchants direclly. and
he adds mat this resiSlance was nO( pcrpelralcd by the hungry and desperate alone. More
suc~ful fishermen in the area-those unsatisfied with Baine Johnston &Co.- had begun
10 sell to other merchants or uaders wherel'er they could get a bener deal and the firm
was. as a result of its need 10 prescn'c its main suppliers. pUI in a position where it could
do liule to SlOp this praclice. Fishermen had shown thai they were capable ofdirect
opposilion to merchant's claims once the moral economy on which the uud.: syslem was
based had been l'iolated. Cadigan conlcnds thal"the actions ofaanle Harbour
Iishermen ... implied that thcy held traditional nOlions about/air prices for fish. or giving
Baine. Johnston afair share oflheir fish in return forfair winter credit allowances.")7 For
these fishermen. it seems that unequal economic exchange had been prel'iously
compensated for. at leasl in part. by the promise of security for themselves and their
families during the wimer. Once the security was removed their loyalties 10 the firm
collapsed. In this sense truck can be seen as a symbiOlic relationship that broke dO\\n as
the financial risk incUJTed by prol'iding \\inter credit became 100 onerous for merchant
firms to safely undertake"
Giwn the abol'e. it can certainly be argued that Newfoundlanders were not
hampered by their cuhure. or at lea..t not 10 the e:-.1ent that Sider is suggesting. My O\'ll
teeling. ho\\"e\"er. is that. while resistance to merchant hegemony was possible. it was
likely much more socially ditlicuh and economically risky than the comparable protest or
·Iq·
negotiation is today. This has much to do. I think. with the fact that class structure has
changed a great deal in both fonn and function. and no longtt presents itself as a social
barrier betwero fishers and authorit)· figures. In raCL fO some extenL the situation has
reversed itself-fisheries managers. for example. are now most accountable to those who
make a living from the resource.
Social Differrntiation and the Academic Conunitus
Through the roll: that he attaches 10 culture. Sider explains how and why outport
residents were kept poor and often even destitute. in a static siluation. for a full cenlury.
BUI was the situation stalic? Certainly there is opposition 10 this claim. Some historians
have: suggested that fishennen and their families were nOI uniform in their economic and
social circumstances. In fact. one pan of the argument is thaL with the introduction of the
cod trap in the 18705. their began a process that led 10 substantial social diO"erentiation
(though it can be argued that thCTe was also plent)· orthis prior to 1870) as well as
considerable capital accumulation in many orthe outpons. And. by 1900. most fishermen
(the same fishermen that Sider claims were busy producing in family units) were .....erling
in crews employed by more prosperous members of the community-those who owned
cod traps. At the same time. merchant houses in competition with one another quickly
spread their o~rations throughout the island. Communities with just one merchanl were
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by now the- e-xcC'ption rather than the norm and most people. therefore. would have had
options open to them when trading their fish:s The significance ofthis for Side-r's
argument cannot be o,"erstatC'd since an important pan of his explanation for the lack of
change that he portrays were lhe ties that bind:'
One of the greatest problems with Sider"s thesis is that he fails to recognize that
there was in fact social differentiation in Newfoundland communities during the ··family.
based fishery:' This would have been particularly we after 1870. with the introduction
of the cod trap" Ofcourse the e:\.1ent ofdifferentiation. like most other lhings. would have
varied o'"er space and time. but Sider seems to think that all fishermen weI"C alike except
insofar as they might ha'"e been cvaluated by their mercham as either "good" or -bad-
tishennen in his "community of account:' Robert Sweeny's paper "Accounting for
Change"" provides us with an intcresting counter to this view which he says is part ofan
academic consensus that has emerged in recent years as a response to crisis in the
fishe~".j-I The consensus is essentially that the -naditional" inshore fishery is a backward.
uneconomical impediment to progress that is. therefore. in need of modernization.
Sn"eeny argues that the consensus was not the work ofan)" one person: talher. it was a
collecti\"C' response- manufactured "almost exclusivC'ly" by academics trom outside of the
pro,"ince. such as Gerald Sider"<IIJ The modcl was then legitimated through peer review.
again outside of Newfoundland. such that those most familiar with lhe society in question
were aftorded no opportuni~" lor input. An erroneous model of Newfoundland society
·:!l-
rcsuhed. and this model directly contributed to the fisheries crisis in the 19905 because it
was an important pan ofme knowledge base that was consulted in dealing with problems
inthefish~·.
More specitically. the model supports the idea that there exists a '1raditionar
inshore fishery where change only comes from outside and where there is no significant
social differentiation. This idea is still very much with us and comes. in part. from
ethnographic studies done in the 196Os. Memorial University was funded at this time by
the federal government to undertake these studies which were largely carried oul in
relatively remote areas such as Fogo Island on the Northeast coast. or in various
communities on the South coast. Sweeny says that these communities were chosen
because of their isolation-apparently it was felt thai these areas would be able 10 reveal
more about the nature of the ..traditional" inshore fishery than would other areas closer to
the capital. This is significant because il shows thai research strategies were designed
with a notion ofchangelessness built in. The distortion then continued into later works
that drew upon these etbnogrophic studies as a reliable representation of rural
Newfoundland society in general. This. says Sweeny. is particularly tnJe ofGerald
Sider's book.
The Structure orCmii': Empirkal Analni.'i or Son.vista's Mertllant kgen
Wori.: done on Bonavista mercham legers by Robert Sweeny. in collaboration with
Robert Hong and David Bradley. has shed some light on the relationship between
merchant and pe~" commodity producer in rural Newfoundland.~1 The preliminaI)·
findings of lhis work thro\\· into question the assumption that most dealers were tied to
panicular merchant houses. Perhaps e\"en more importantly. the Jegers of Ryan·s finn
contain infonnation about the relationships between clients-ofthose who were
employers. and of those who wcre ··linked·· to them as employees. In order to make sense
of the results that these sludics present (the empirical analysis is quite complex). it is
necessary: to discuss in some detail the methodology that was used. Full credit must be
given to the author of these works. however. and what follows is intended only as a "'e~·
rough sketch oflhese ideas to highlighl some ofthe more imponant points.
In this study. merchant legeTS for two merchant firms in Bona\'ista for the years
1889-91 are examined as historical evidence. At this time. J. T. Ryan. the larger of the
two finns. dealt \\-ith a relatively stable number of clients while Templeman·s was still
growing. The table below is used to compare the number of accounts in each finn with
the number of families in the region. Thc results clearly show that there were many more
accounts than there were families. These ligures seem to indicate that both firms enjoyed
market dominance and stability but the author makes an important point: ·More than one-
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third (634, or 37 per cent) of the clients of the "stablc" J.T. Ryan and T1 early one-half
(385, or 47 per cent) of Phillip Templcman's clients eithcr appeared in or disappeared
from their books during this short three year period:>-l2 So, there was 3 phenomenal
Tab(~ r",-o
Numhcrof CJicnt ACC{'lunts in IMt Cnmfl<'T«i .....lith d'c
Numhc:r uf Farnilic:s A1:curding w lbc: Cc:rn;w;urthal ypr
---
Number-of Ryan', led'PJmtall'l!i
FamiliCi:
flOfl~\'iSUl 659 941 599
UpS..... 114 149 36
Tqp qfTriDity Iloy 119 224 34
Adapted from: Robert C. ~I. Sweeny, with David Bradley and Robert Hong, "Movement, Options and
Costs: Indexes as Historical Evidence, a Newfoundland Example,~Acadiensis XXii, I (Autumn 1992).
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amount of movement by individuals in their dealings with these mcrchttnt firms. And. the
fact that there were many morc accounts than families is enough to suggest that the
fishery at this time was not simply family based. The findings go furtll cr however.
The indexes for Ryan's firm identify clients that are linked and. although the exact
nature of the linkages are not known for all cases. the author says that ,"in the vast
majority of cascs this linkage was indicative of a social relationship ofproduction:,4J
Servant's names were to be found bcsidc their employers and ships carTtain's were listcd
with their crews. Many employers hired on a very small scale, preslIll1ttbly many ofthcsc
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were crew members hired on by a captain for a season or less. However. a couple of
"relatively large employers accounted for 57 per cent of the 569 person·years identified
as being linked in the indcxcs:·.l.l We can conclude. therefore, thai employment outside
of the family was a significant contributor to social differentiation within the community.
There were large and smali employers as well as operations thai were strictly family
based. Fishennen. it seems. were not all alike in their social and economic circumstances.
Most interesting of all were the results ofa comparison between the two firms: "of the
825 client accounts on the books ofTcmpleman's in the years 188910 1891.378 people
(46 per cent) were "firm links:' while a further 140 people (17 per cent) were "probable
links.' So. more than half orthc total number of c1ienls maintained accounts with both
firms And. those who were not linked were found 10 be least likely to be on the books
for all three years. In other words, those who were dealing with only one merchant were
most mobile. These results. of course. are in stark contrast with the claim that people
were bound to one merchant. The author notes the implications that this data holds for
the "anthropological culturalist explanation" which he says Sider represents, but cautions
that it calls into question. also. the acceptance by historians ora lop-down approach in
understanding Newfoundland history.
In a more recent article by the same author-one that was ....Tinen 10 build upon the
findings discussed abo\"e-entitled "Accounting for Change: Understanding Merchant
Credit Strategies in 0Ulpon Newloundland:' the author directly challenges the
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historiographical convention which holds that the ties binding outport residents to their
suppliers afforded merchanlS the ability to buy fish cheap and sell goods at high prices
because they were dealing with a captive market. According to this analysis. which is
based on a particular definition of··non·perfonning loan,- the fact that the ties did nOi
bind may ha\'e been a large part of the reason that prices were high and returns on tish
low.~' The author compares non-performing loans for both Ryan's and Templeman·s.
again lortheycars 188910 1891.
The findings indicatc that the amounlS owed to thcse finns by the majority of
clients were small. but the cumulative impact on the financial situmion of the finns was
significant Ryan's was worse otT. comparatively speaking. because it had becn in
businl.'Ss longer. Ryan's linn "had as many inactive accounts in arrears on its books as it
did active accounts and" at all but the highest levels. non·pcrfonning loons outnumbered
and outweighed credit advances to active accounts.~ The author notes that it was the
scak and prevalence ofsmall non·perfonning loans. particularly among young people
who were more prone to out-migration. that made them panicularly difficult for the
merchant 10 deal with. Suicler controls on credit would not solve the problem. so the
merchant strategy was to cover their losses in other ways: by charging more for goods in
their stores and buying fish at a lower price. Strategies were found to vary among
merchants. howevcr. depending upon the options and constraints that each operated
under. This was no less true ofRyan"s and Templeman"s.
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To shed more light on relations between merchants and their clients. a comparative
analysis was conducted on -prominent c1ients- at both firms based on outstanding credit
at year's end and on sales offish by each client. Because the two firms \..-ere ofdifferent
sizr:s and dealt with di fferent kinds ofclients (Ryan's dealt with more dealers and traders
while Templeman's dealt mostly with smaller producers) the definition ofa prominent
client was different for each firm. For R~'an. sales offish were placed at $250.00 (at
leas!) while at Templeman's it was $100.00. In tenos ofcredit advances. $500.00 was
considered prominent at Ryan·s. and $ 100.00 al Templeman·s. The reliability of these
categorics was then tested against the value of all retail sales. and what was found was
thaI. at both tirms. "a tenth of active accounts were responsible for halfof all retail
transactions and substantially greater amounts offish:'H Since these accounts
cOrTCSpondl:<! very well with the definitions of prominence in each case. the author was
able to express confidence in his definitions.
A test was then conducted.. through an analysis of the categories of prominent
clients at both finns. to detennine whether the common assumption -that credit prct:eded
and dictated the contours of the relationship between lisher and merchant"~'holds true for
these firms. The results. however. suggest thaI this was not the casco If it were. says the
author. then we could expect that. in each case. those clients selling the most fish would
also have receivcd more credit. Instead. whal was found was that. in 1889 (the beginning
of the study period). 'at both lirms. accounts receiving close to a third of the credit
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supplied only 3% to -t% of the fish:' But there was change in these relationships: at the
end of 1891. 50010 ofall credit at Templeman's was gi\'en to a group that supplied only
one per cent of the fish. while at Ryan's a similar grouping received just 16~. ofall
credil.~·
These changes. which arc indicative ofdiffering credit strategies. mde more
sense when we take into account the levels ofconstraint that each finn was operating
under. Templeman·s. a much smaller and more recently established finn. relied.. toa
large eXlenL on credit from its suppliers. As a resulL retail goods al Templeman's would
have had 10 be: mo\"ed in order-to make payments. Templeman·s more generous credit
policy was therefore necessary. and might also have represented an anempt 10 increase his
supply of fish: if this was the case. however. it did not work. For Ryan. on the other
hand. payments would nOI have been a problem since his finn was in possession of the
capital ncces~" to can:- on business wilh his suppliers on a eash basis_ Because of this.
Ryan was able to exercise a greater degree oflewrage on his clientele. perhaps. as the
author suggests. by forbidding funher retail purchases at his store by owing clients until
their de~1S were senled. And. while Templeman was forced to gamble on what he hoped
were good producers. Ryan·s large credit ad\'ances were given to established large
producers which likely im"oh"ed substantially less risk. Not surprisingly then.
Templeman's on:rall standing deteriorated somewhat over the course oflhe study period.
while Ryan was able to greatly improve his.
What i:i most suiking ofall. as the author points ouL is that at both finns most
clients did not sell any fish al all. Over the three years. the share of retail sales attributed
[0 this group increased from 39% to +4~" at Ryan ·s. and from 11~. to J~~" al
Templeman·s.'" This group of"nan-fish accounts.- for reasons which I will discuss
shortly. may be of the gualesl importance for underslanding whal might otherwise seem
like bad business sense among merchants. BUL from what has been said so far. we can
begin to SUSJ>cr1 thai nol only was credit less binding than some have suggested. but it
was also more or less selective depending on the constraints that particular mcrchants
were faced wilh.
This brings us to one of the most important questions that work on the Bonavista
merchant legers has addressed: gh'en that the majority ofclients doing business with
these tirms were nOi selling fish. whal were they doing? For both firms. the total ofail
accounts outnumbers the total of prominent accounts byal least 3: I for the entire sludy
period. In 1891. forexampk. Ryan had a lotal of68 prominenl clients who supplied him
with 84~o ofhis fish. but the total number ofaccounts was 105.~l Since prominent
accounts supplied the firms with lite bulk of their fish. we know thai lite majorily of the
other accounts must havc been for other purposes. This faci has nOi been recognized in
past studies ormerchant-tisher relalions which have typically adopted a relatively
simplistic vicw of merchants as fish buyers. creditors. and \'cry little else.
I have made fairly cxtc:nsive use OftlH:SC two works on Bonavista merchant legers
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because they are unique in Newfoundland. Extensive empirical analysis of merchant
legers has nO{ previously been undenaken. owing. perhaps. as the author says. to the
complexity of the task and the conceptual difiiculties inherent in making sense of the
data. But. as I think Sweeny and his collaborators have shown. records such as these
comain information that. if properly analyzed. can be extremely imponant to
contemporary historiogr"dphy. Bearing in mind the revised conception ofcredit already
imroduced. a further point rcm;:ains to be made regarding the non-fish ;:accounts discussed
above. Sweeny makes the point that much of what wem on in rural Newfoundland has
long gone unrecognized by academics or has otherwise been dismissed as subsistence
activity. These other activities. however. such as the labour carried out by women and
children. or more specialized activities such as boat building and carpentry. were also
extremely important.
The value accorded to differcmlypes of labour in the infonnal economy was
locally defined. This value could also be appropriated. however. and merchants were able
to do so by charging high prices IOf goods that werc essential 10 the successful operation
orthc informal economy. This included. nails. cloth. or anything else that could not be
manufactured locally. In Ihis way. the informal economy generated profitable business in
-30-
merchant's stores. Just as import3nl howe\'er. was the business generated through the
settlement ofdebts. Paymenl for 5e1'\'ices rendered gent.-r3l1y did not take the fonn of
cash. so if the merchant was Cl'3fty enough to gel himself involved in these transa.ctions.
payments could be credited to the savice provider's account at his store. This ensured
that most of the funds im'olved would be spent at that business. By using his business as
a "c1earing house:' a merchant could capture a much larger share of the total amount of
economic activity in his area. The same was true. of course_ of the formal economy.
Ryan's core of prominent clients were allowed substantial amounts ofcredit because they
generated additional business. Dealers and traders would have brought with Ihem
employees who could be paid through their accounts at the store. Credit. therefore. could
be. and was. used as an elTecti\"c means of maximizing the tolal amount of business that a
linn was able to capture.~:
A study by Rosc'fflaI)' Ommer' on the relationship between the infonnal economy
and merchant credit in Newfoundland sug~1S that credit was crucial in making possible
the transition Irom a migratory to a resident fish~·. By the end of the seventeenth
century. caretakers (those who wintered in Newfoundland to protect fishing premises for
their employers in England) had given way to residents and merchants were now faced
with the problem ofseasonality in the fishery. The)' solved this problem by expanding
their operations both geographically. by setting up stations all along the coast to lengthen
the season. and by expanding into other commercial activities. particularly sealing and
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trapping, But an equalI~" difficult problem remained: that of maintaining a labour force at
remote locations where employment was scarce or non-existent for most of the year, This
was where credit became important. By blending commercial and subsistence
acti,'ity-pro\"iding the essentials for subsistence on credit during the ofT-season in return
lor remuneration in the form of fish when the fishery began-merchants were able to
maintain the necessary: labour for their operations. and residents gained access to markets
for their goods,~ Ommer attempts to answer the question of whether this symbiotic
relationship changed as the resident population grew and labour became abUJ'ldant and. if
so. how,
A comparative analysis of consumption patterns. in Bonavisla and Little Bay
Islands. between fishermen and their families and oth~r community members who were
more affluent. or who at least had stable incomes. was used to demonstrat~ the
importance and extcnt of the operation of the informal economy in the first halfof the
twentieth century, It was shown that consumption patterns were markedly different
between tht:SC two groups with fishenncn purchasing only essentials like salt and
molasses while those outside the infonnal economy were more prone to luxury items and
more expensi,'e lOodstuffs" The types of purchases that fishenncn \\"ere making (and not
making) is taken as proof that these residents were living in a household-production
economy that was rooted in. and dependant on. the continued relationship between the
informal and commercial economies,!~
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Credit should. therefore. be seen as an important component ofllle economy of
Newfoundland.. and perhaps cvcn an indispensable one when we consider the extreme
shonage of circulating cash in the region at this time. As population ~w. labour
shonage was no longer a problem for merchants. but credit remained important to
business for a different reason. It allowed merchants to utilize the larger number of
fishers to increase the \'olume ofllleir trade. For fishCTmen. credit was in fact preferable
to cash in dealings with merchants because the risk belonged to the merchant.~ II has
often been said that the people of this time in Newfoundland were capable of starving
with money in the bank.
Technology and the Cod Market
The reasons why Newfoundland"s fishery lost its competitive edge in lIle late 19"
and early 20'" centuries have been lIle subject of much debate by academics. The first
World War. ofcourse. had a large role to play in lIlat it increased demand and therefore
price for its duration. This had lIle effect ofoffsetting an appropriate and timely response
(supposing one existed) by government and indus~' to the SU"UClural problems that the
fishery had developed. An earlier generation ofscholars has tcndcd to place blame on
merchants who. it \\ as said. were more interested in interior development because of the
smaller lcvel ofassociated risk. The failure ofmcrchants to invest in the fishery. and to
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regulate production and marketing techniques was said to have led to stagnation in
Newfoundland's economy.~7
Yet ewn as scholars, such as Eric Sager, placed blame, it was noted that merchants
were very likely doing all that could be e:o.;pected of people in their situation. Sager notes.
for example. that ..thl.'Se entrepreneurs could not restructure an ancient indust~:. solve the
intractable problem ofdeterioration in the curing process, regulate production over a fe\v
thousand miles ofcoast·line. and at the same time eliminate foreign competitors:'ss So
blame. in this case. does not really amount to blame at all. Roben Hong has indicated
that David Alexander's interpretation also has its problems. for while Alexander charged
merchants with "neglect." he too felt that there were underlying structural problems
preventing change that were beyond their control.H More recently. however. scholars
like Sean Cadigan have begun to consider that the role of merchants in Newfoundland's
economy \\-as much more complex.. with credit having evolved as a method ofdealing
wilh limited resources."" William Reeves. too. argues that neither merchants nor
government were guilty ofneglecting Ihe fishe~': in fact. they were aClively involved in
atlempts 10 restructure it,~l Their failure was a resull of the industry's inability to adopt
and adapt to new technology.~:
Raben Hong has suggested that the introduction of the cod trap in the late 1911l
century had a very important role 10 play in exacerbating the structural impediments to
change in Newfoundland's fishe~·. The cod trap greatly increased the volume of fish
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landed while simuhaneously shonening the period of time in which it was caught and
placed. as well. a considerable strain on the financial resources of merchanlS since it was
they_ more often than not who financed them_ This may have directl~' impacted upon the
ability ofmen:hanlS to rcinn:st in the fishery. But it was in its effect upon the quality of
the finished product that the cod trap was most damaging. Much more small.
unmarketable fish were kept and processed beeause ofsmall mesh sizes-which pro"cd
impossible for gO"emmcnt to police c"en though legislation was passed to correctthc
problem. And. while the technology for catching fish changed. the processing of it did
noL Crews were hard pressed to properly handle such large amounts offish using
traditional methods. and. as a result. the overall quality of fish processed for market
deteriorated. This. in tum. had a negative effecl 00 the demand for Newfoundland's
fish.~; With the end of the war. prices for fish quickly fell from a high ofSI4A6 per
quintal in 1919 to $6.71 per quintal in 1924. and afta some improvement from 1925-30.
they fell funher to stand al ~.26 per quintal in 1933.~
I think that Sider's contention that fishermen and their families were "dominated"
by merchants is in need of some considerable qualification. This is not to say thai
merchants were withoul blame in all cases. But 10 say that they held in their grasp the
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abili~' to substantially impro\"e conditions in the Clutports. and could. if only they were
more bene"olent o"erestimates (probably quite substantially) the options that they had
open to them. The assumption that most communities had only one merchant is very
important 10 Sider's thesis because it is a large pan of the basis for their supposed control.
This is ,"cry damaging since it is historically inaccurate. My O\\TI knowledge of
l:ommunitics on Fogo Island is enough to call this into question: from my relatives 1 have
leamed that. prior to 1950. there were three mercham houses in Joe Ban's Arm alone. and
I know that there were at least twO in the communi~·ofFogo. But. apart from this.
credit-the real "illain ofSider's work. in that it kept social differentiation and
infrastructure al a minimum-was aClually a nceessi~' in making business. and indeed
existence. in the outports ,·iable. Furthennore. it has been sho\\TI that there was
substantial social differentiation among outport residents that was fueled. in part. by
technological change. Perhaps !he most important lesson here is that people exercise
choice in their dealings with others. whether they be merchants or fishennen. Outpon
residents in Bona,·ista. panieularly young ones. often simply left if they felt that they
eould do bener dsewhere. ofien Iea"ing their debt5 behind them. Fishenncn in Banle
Harbour wen;: prepared to forcibly take that which they felt was rightfully !heirs and were
prepared to abandon the finn !hat they had been associated with onee !hey felt that the
obligations owed to them were not being met. Merchants. in their tum. adopted credit
policies that were tailored to meet the needs of their opcralions and keep them profitable.
Both sides had choices to makc and both developed coping stralcgies 10 deal with their
rcsp«:li\"csitualions.
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